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Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White
Should Judges Be More Like Politicians?
By Roy A. Schotland

T

he Supreme Court's decision in Republican Party
of Minnesota v. White shows how unrealistic five
justices can be about what happens in judicial eJection campaigns, and also--ironically-about how much
judges differ from legislators and others who run for
office. This reality ,vas captured concisely by Robert
Hirshon, immediate past president of the American Bar
Association (ABA) in his statement following the Court's
ruling: "This is a bad decision. It will open a Pandora's
Box ...." The decision will change judicial election campaigns in such a way that the quality of the pool of candidates for the bench will likely diminish, good judges will
be less willing to seek reelection, and the public's cynical
view that judges are merely "another group of politicians"
will gain further impetus. This will directly hurt state
courts and indirectly hurt all our courts.
After noting the majority and separate opinions-which,
un surprisingly, raise many questions-this article will predict what litigation lies ahead, then desclibe the current
judicial election environment and prospects for reform.
TIle White decision is not reducible to the simplistic,
misleading proposition that ';Notwithstanding ABA policy
to the contrary, the law of the land now holds that the
First Amendment trumps all other considerations when it
comes to judicial elections."] Justice Scalia's majority
opinion held that Minnesota could not prohibit a candidate for judicial office from "announcing his or her views
on disputed legal or political issues.,,2 Although that
"Announce Clause" has been law in only nine states, the
decision will impact all but one of the thirty-nine states in
which at least some judges face elections of some type,
because all (except North Carolina) have canons limiting
what candidates may say when campaigning for the
bench. One limitation, as Justice Scalia wrote, bars judicial c[mdidates from making "pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impmtial performance of the duties of the office,"-a prohibition that, as
he wrote, "is not challenged here and on which we
express no view.,,3 As for a third limitation, "[tJhe Court's

treatment of the ['Commit Clause' J precluding a candidate
from making 'statements that commit or appear to commit the
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are
likely to come before the court' was, unfortunately, not a
model of clarity.',4 Justice Stevens, writing for the four dissenting justices, said this:
By obscuring the fundamental distinction between campaigns
for the jUdiciary and the political branches, and by failing to
recognize the difference between statements made in articles
or opinions and those made on the campaign trail, the Court
defies any sensible notion of the judicial office and the importance of impartiality in that context. 5

Arguably, the most significant point of the m~jority opinion
is that whether or not the Court "obscur[ed)" the distinction
between judicial and nonjudicial elections, it did not ignore it.
It did not adopt what Justice Ginsburg, also writing for the
four dissenters, called ';the unilocular, 'an election is an election' approach.,,6 As an example of that approach, she quoted
the dissenting judge below: "When a state opts to hold an
election, it must commit itself to a complete election, replete
with free speech and association."?
The majority's opinion reveals that one or more justices are
unwilling or at least unready to strike more (or much more)
regulation of judicial campaigns: "Justice Ginsburg [attacks]
an argument we do not make. [WJe neither asselt nor imply
that the First Amendment requires campaigns for judicial
office to sound the same as those for legislative office."s
Of course, it is difficult to say how many of the five majority justices would strike how much more of the canons, but it
is hard to see why their opinion would have included any
such limitation if all five agreed with what Justice Kennedy
said alone.
Justice Kennedy, who joined the m[~ority and also wrote
alone, views judicial elections as like (or not materially different from) nonjudicial elections, and so would strike aU limits
on candidate speech. But he made two impOltant points about
what can be done to meet injudicious conduct in judicial campaigns: States "may adopt recusal standards more rigorous
than due process requires, and censure judges who violate
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Judicial IndependenceFree Speech Means
Impartiali ty
By William F. Dressel
\Vith the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Republican
Party of AJimu'SO/(1 v. Whirl', the war of words expounding
legal and philosophical positions has begun. The tinest
legal minds will anaJyze and enlighten LIS on what i~ meant
hy "communicating relevant information to voters during a
judicial eJection," Clearly, judicial candidates are nOW
authorized to engage to some degree in discussion of relevant political issues. Until such a time. if there ever be
such time, when a bright-line standard is established, r
wDuld suggest that both sitting judiCial officers and candidates address this issue from a practical common sense
point of view honoring impartiality.
\Vhen a judge is elected to office, it is a voluntary commitment (not in the mental health sense) to conduct one's
persona!, public, and professional life in a career that has
privileges and limitations not known to other profc~sions.
The discussion about one's speech or behavior that each
judicial officer should have with himself or herself is
framed by looking inside oneself for the impartiality, dignity, and independent components that make up judicial

these standards." And in the most significant step since White, the Missouri
Supreme COUlt has acted along just
such lines, as noted below.
Kennedy also encouraged what is
often called "more speech to meet
speech":
The legal profession, the legal academy, the press, voluntm'y groups,
political and civic leaders, and all
interested citizens can use their own
First Amendment freedoms to
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integrity. A judge does not need to read or he instructed by
a judicia! decisioll or canOll to understand the wisdom of
this i ntrospectiol1.

Judges, by virtue or their position, are subject to a number of ;·thou shall and shall nots.'· The ·'shalt" relevant to
this issue is the faithful and impartial perforrnance of the
duties of the office. The "shaH not" requires that a judge
not make pledges or promises of conduct. From a common
sense standpoint, a judge cannot remain independent when
promises or statements are made that commit the judge to
rule a certain way.
It is not easy to maintain the dignity appropriate to a
judicial office in these times. Conducting one's daily judi·
cial life is not simple. Many judges must participate in
elections. The proceedings that lead up to those elections
require tbat judges speak knmvJedgeably and firmly about
justice. Add to this the growing pressure on judges to be
innovative and act as problem solvers, and you have judges
engaging in acts or speech that open them up to criticism
or questions.
ll1ere is not just an outcry, but a demand that judges be
full participants in society, which may result in conduct or
speech tbat has the potential to adversely impact the dignity
of the court. In that respect, isn't it interesting bov" judges
and others who refer to liS use tbe generic "the court"
whereby judges are Iden'ed to not as persons, but as institutions! Yet, there are Limes that the judge is acting or
speaking as an institution. \V'hen seeking election, the
incumbent tries to blur the distinction between the individ-

protest statements inconsistent with
standards of judicial neutrality and
judicial excellence. Indeed, if
democracy is to fulfill its promise,
they must do SO.9

Justice Stevens made the same
point, adding that even official bodies
like the defendant board in this case
"may surely advise the electorate that
such announcemenls demonstrate the
speaker's unfitness for judicial office. If
the solution to harmti:tl speech must be
· ,,10
more speech,so be It.
Justice O'Connor, also joining the
majority and also writing alone, took a
familiar and simple approach: We
shouldn't have judicial elections,
because of the fundamental tension
between judicial independence and
elections. But she ignored reality-the
difficulty of ending judicial elections.
For example, Florida's voters in 2000
("yes Virginia, there were other things
011 the ballot!") overwhelmingly rejected changing from contestable eJections
for their trial judges, to the same system of merit-appointment and "reten-
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tion" elections that they have for their
appellate judges (with voters deciding
only whether a sitting judge will continue or not). The opposition to the
change was led by the women's and
minority bar associations; similarly in
1987, Ohio voters overwhelmingly
agreed with the opposition's key advertisement against change: "Don't let
them take away your vote!"I]
The surest result of the White decision is (for a change) more litigation, of
three types. First, there will be two
kinds of lawsuits about the provisions
limiting speech, the "Commit Clause"
and the "Pledge or Promise Clause."
There will be attacks on tbe facial constitutionality of each clause, and there
will be disputes about whether this or
that particular statement violated one or
both of those clauses. Second, there
will be litigation over whether the seventeen states that have chosen nonpartisan elections for all or some of their
judges can preserve the nonpmtisanship
they prefer. Minnesota, like most or all
of these states, bans party endorse-

ments-indeed, the plaintiff who
brought the 1;Fhite case was joined by
the Republican Party of Minnesota
because of this provision. Their attack
on it was rejected in the lower comts,
and the Supreme Court excluded that
issue when it gnmted certiorari-but
now that we have White, surely courts
will be asked to revisit this issue. In
addition, the nonpartisan states limit
judicial candidates from announcing
12
their own pmty affiliation. Will that
limitation stand up? Last, all but four of
the thirty-nine states bar judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign funds; also, most of these states
13
limit the time period for fundraising.
Will these limitations survive'?
"'hite will figure, perhaps subst~m
tially, in the next U.S. Senate confimmlion hearing of any nominee for a federaljudgeship who is reticent about
answering senators' questions regarding
his or her views. Justice Ginsburg drew
on several of the briefs for, as Justice
Scalia put it, "repeated invocation of
instances in which nominees to this

Court declined to announce [views on
disputed legal issues J during Senate confirmation hearings ... :' Scalia said that
the majority "do [notl assert that candidates for judicial office should be compelled to ~nounce their views ... .',1-1
Stay posted!
Of the nation's 10,000 state judges,
most still face elections of some
type-contestable partisan or nonpartisan, or retention. That's after a century of major effort by the bar and
good government groups for adoption
of the "merit" retention system.
"Judicial reform is not for the shortwinded," as New Jersey's great Chief
Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt taught.
But true as it is that during the last
generation voters rejected "merit"
systems, perhaps we are entering a
new era, perhaps recent changes in
judicial elections will increase voters'
willingness to change these systems.
Meanwhile, don't we need to work at
reducing the problematic aspects of
judicial elections?
Until 1978, judicial elections were

as uneventful as playing checkers by
mail. That year in Los Angeles County,
a number of Jerry Brown-appointed
trial judges were defeated. Then in the
1980s in Texas, campaign spending
soared. But the biggest change
occurred in 2000 when campaign
spending set sharply higher records in
ten of the twenty states with high court
elections, and nationally, high comt
candidates raised 61 percent more than
ever before. Also, outside groups like
the Chamber of Commerce spent about
sixteen million dollars in just the five
liveliest states: Alabama, Illinois,
Michigan, Mississippi, and Ohio. The
"nastier and noisier" campaigning in
2000 was more like nonjudicial campaigns than ever before.
The states that chose judicial elections did not want them to be like other
elections. Their constitutional histories
show that elections seemed less problematic than appointments, which
seemed elitist and/or mere political
patronage. But those states accompanied judicial elections with constitu-

9
HeinOnline -- 41 Judges J. 9 2002

The impact of elections
on iudicial indepen ence
is amplified because so
many states have such
short terms for iudges.
tional provisions unthinkable for other
elective officials-like uniquely long
temIS. The constitutions of the thirtynine states in which judges face elections of some type have an alTay of
such provisions, unique to the judiciary,
to accommodate the choice of popular
selection with the constitutional value
of judicial independence. In all thirtynine states (except Nebraska), judges'
terms are longer than any other elective
official's. In thirty-seven of these states,
only judges are subject to both
impeachment and special disciplinary
process. In thirty-three states, judges
are the only elective state officials subject to requirements of training and/or
experience (except that in ten of those
states, the attorney general is subject to
similar requirements). In twenty-three
states, only judges are subject to
mandatory age retirement. In twentyone states, only judicial nominations go
through nominating commissions; in
six states, this applies even to interim
appointments. Last, in eighteen states,
only judges cannot run for a nonjudicial office without first resigning.
The impact of elections on judicial
independence is amplified because so
many states have such short ternlS for
judges. Although temlS are uniquely
long in some states (e.g., fourteen years
in New York, twelve years in
California), in fifteen states even the
high comts have only six-year telms. In
twenty-five states, trial judges have sixyear temlS, and in another nine, only
four-year terms. One can't help but be
deeply troubled by what shOit temlS
may mean for non routine cases at all
levels--for example, at the trial level,

sentencing and mlings on bail.
Of appellate judges who face elections, 38.5 percent have temlS of ten to
fifteen years and another 60.6 percent
have six- to eight-year temls. Of trial
judges who face elections, 13 percent
have terms of ten to fifteen years, and
another 67.6 percent have six- to eightyear temls. This pattern shows that the
choice of elections, "while perhaps a
decision of questionable wisdom, does
not signify the abandonment of the
ideal of an impartial judiciary carrying
out its duties fairly and thoroughly."l;
Thirty-nine states have recognized that
far from fulfilling the historic purpose
in allowing for the popular election of
judges, any effort to treat judicial elections like other elections wholly undermines the judiciary's independent role.
Their baltmced approach to the proper
structure for an elected judiciary
embodies the understanding that:
The word "representative" connotes
one who is not only elected by the
people, but who also, at a minimum,
acts on behalf of the people. Judges
do that in a sense-but not in the
ordinary sense .... The judge represents the Law-which often requires
him to rule against the People. 16
Five justices have decided that judicial election campaigns cannot be kept
as different as the states want. The
Pandora's Box that Robert Hirshon predicts will be opened by the small
minority of judicial candidates who
simply want to win, and the dynamics
of campaigns will show a race for
media coverage and appeals to singleissue groups.
Keeping judicial elections judicious
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involves not only the First Amendment,
but also the due process rights of litigants. Further, as judicial campaigns
become more similar to other campaigns, judges will continue to become
more like politicians and the public will
view them as such. Do we want decisions on the First Amendment (and
other constitutional protections) made
by people who are more like legislators, or different from that? If judges
are more like legislators, won't that
threaten the legitimacy of having courts
review the constitutionality of actions
by the political branches?
Perhaps more states will end contestable judicial elections altogether.
But meanwhile? First, what should candidates do now? Take advantage of
what the Missouri Supreme Court
ordered in response to White: 17 After
noting which of its provisions would no
longer be enforced and which would
remain in full force and effect, it provided (to finish its less-than-two-page
order) as follows: Recusal [which
includes disqualificationl, or other
remedial action, may nonetheless be
required of any judge in cases that
involve an issue about which the judge
has announced his or her views as otherwise may be appropriate under the
Code of Judicial Conduct.
This is an inspired step. It supports
the overwhelming majority of candidates
who want to campaign judiciouslythey'll be able to say, "} know what
you'd like me to say, but if I go into that
then I'll be unable to sit injust the ca~es
you care about most" In addition, it
enables any candidate whose opponent
has stretched the envelope (with some
variant of "I'll hang them all," or "I
believe that anyone convicted of child
abuse should receive the maximum sentence allowed by law," or 'T m a tenant,
not a hmdlord"), to respond with ''My
opponent has told you what he thinks
you want, but hasn't told you that he
won't be able to deliver; he'll be disqualified from the ca<;es you care about"
The most important step in meeting
the challenge was urged in May by
Ohio's Chief Justice Moyer: Lengthen
judicial terms to at least eight years.
That single step will reduce the problems inherent in judicial elections, and
will go far to enlarge and enrich the pool
(continued on page 45)

Judges More
Like Politicians
(continued from page JO)
of people willing to seek judgeships,
and to encourage them to continue serving. And improving the caliber of those
who serve as judges is obviously the
goal of all refonn of judicial selection.
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Perspective on
Tensions
(continuedfrom page 29)
independence if pressure is a real or
perceived problem. In Wisconsin, the
supreme COUIt justices have a ten-year
tenn. All other judges serve for six
years. The public would be better
served if all judges had ten-year temlS.
Despite its flaws, the election system has produced good, competent, and
hardworking judges. Still, the system
can be improved. For instance, an ethical code should acknowledge the
increased number of lawyer couples
and families in the legal profession and
the advantage they enjoy in campaign
fundraising. This fundraising advantage
should be removed by permitting candidates to solicit funds, or by public
funding of all judicial campaigns. The
process must allow candidates to
describe their philosophy to the voters
while simultaneously supporting judicial concerns over decisional independence by lengthening terms.

Judges Abroad
(continued .fimn page 3 J)
The commitment of willing volunteers
and unselfish leaders is essential to
bring the prospect of fundamental freedom and judicial independence to these
trouble spots. Without promoting the
mle of law in this region, there is little
hope for the tj-eedom and development
necessary to bring to it the tranquility
the people there deserve.
So although I will miss the chance
to work with CEEU and the judges of
Azerbaijan, I hope someday there will
be a CEEU presence in places like
Israel and Palestine. If given the opportunity to participate in progranls there,
I would do everything possible to avoid
having to write another article about
why I was unable to go.
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